Saturday, September 29, 2012

CHAPTER 213 THE BUSINESS NAMES (REGISTRATION) ACT [PRINCIPAL LEGISLATION] ARRANGEMENT OF SECTIONS


CHAPTER 213
THE BUSINESS NAMES (REGISTRATION) ACT
[PRINCIPAL LEGISLATION]
ARRANGEMENT OF SECTIONS
Section
Title
1. Short title.
2. Interpretation.
3. Registrar and deputies.
4. Firms and persons to be registered.
5. Registration by nominee, etc.
6. Manner and particulars of registration.
7. Statement to be signed by persons registering.
8. Time for registration.
9. Restriction on registration of certain business names.
10. Registration not to authorise use.
11. Registration of changes in firm.
12. Rectification of the register in certain cases.
13. Penalty for default in registration.
14. Penalty for carrying on business under unauthorised name.
15. Disability of persons in default.
16. Penalty for false statements.
17. Duty to furnish particulars to the Registrar.
18. Registrar to file statement and issue certificate of registration.
19. Index to be kept.
20. Removal of names from register.
21. Inspection of statements registered.
22. Power of Minister to make rules.
23. Publication of true names, etc.
24. Offences by corporations.
SCHEDULE
CHAPTER 213
THE BUSINESS NAMES (REGISTRATION) ACT
An Act to provide for the registration of business names.
[21st February, 1930]
Ords. Nos.
1 of 1930
37 of 1955
Acts Nos.
4 of 1975
13 of 1991
1. Short title
This Act may be cited as the Business Names (Registration) Act.
2. Interpretation In this Act unless the context otherwise requires–
"business" includes profession;
"business name" means the name or style under which any business is carried
on, whether in partnership or otherwise;
"firm" means an unincorporate body of two or more individuals, or one or more
individuals and one or more corporations, or two or more corporations, who have
entered into partnership with one another with a view to carry on business for profit;
"foreign firm" means any firm, individual or corporation whose principal place of business is not situated within Tanzania;

REVEREND CHRISTOPHER R. MTIKILA V THE UNITED REPUBLUC OF TANZANIA APPLICATION NO. 011/2011


CASE NOTE
REVEREND CHRISTOPHER R. MTIKILA V THE UNITED REPUBLUC OF TANZANIA
APPLICATION  NO. 011/2011
A. THE PARTIES
1. The Applicant, Reverend Christopher R. Mtikila, is a citizen of the United
Republic of Tanzania. He is represented by Counsels, Setondji Adjovi, Mary R.
Birdi, Deogratias M. Njau and Megan R. Thompson, all of  Etudes Vihode of
Benin,  Charles Adeogun-Phillips of Charles Anthony LLP (Nigeria) and Francis
Dako of Cabinet Francis Dako, Benin.
2. The Respondent is the United Republic of Tanzania and is a State Party to the
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (African Charter) having ratified it
on 18 February 1984 and in respect of which it entered into force on 21 October
1986. The Respondent is a State Party to the Protocol to the African Charter on
Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Establishment of an African Court on Human
and Peoples’ Rights (Protocol Establishing the Court)  which it ratified on 6
February 2006. The applicant alleges that the Respondent  has  deposited the
Declaration required under Article 34(6) of the Protocol Establishing the Court
allowing individuals and NGOs with Observer Status before the Commission to
directly access the Court. Further, the Respondent is also a State Party to the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) since 11 June 1976.
3. The Respondent is represented by:

Application No. 009/2011 Tanganyika Law Society & Legal and Human Rights Centre v. The United Republic of Tanzania


Application No. 009/2011
Tanganyika Law Society & Legal and Human Rights Centre
v. The United Republic of Tanzania
Summary of facts
1. The Applicants submit that the Respondent State is in violation of Article 2 and
13(1) of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, and articles 3 and
25 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), a violation
that was institutionalized in 1992, at the onset of multiparty politics in the country.
2. According to the Applicants, in 1992, the National Assembly passed the Eighth
Amendment to the Constitution and prescribed a requirement for membership to
and sponsorship by a political party for all persons running  for  Presidential,
Parliamentary and Local Government elections. They submit further that in 1993,
a certain Reverend Mtikila challenged the 8
th
constitutional amendment, and on
16
th
October 1994, the Respondent tabled a bill, the 11
th
Constitutional

Application No. 009/2011 Tanganyika Law Society & Legal and Human Rights Centre v. The United Republic of Tanzania


Application No. 009/2011
Tanganyika Law Society & Legal and Human Rights Centre
v. The United Republic of Tanzania
Summary of facts
1. The Applicants submit that the Respondent State is in violation of Article 2 and
13(1) of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, and articles 3 and
25 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), a violation
that was institutionalized in 1992, at the onset of multiparty politics in the country.
2. According to the Applicants, in 1992, the National Assembly passed the Eighth
Amendment to the Constitution and prescribed a requirement for membership to
and sponsorship by a political party for all persons running  for  Presidential,
Parliamentary and Local Government elections. They submit further that in 1993,
a certain Reverend Mtikila challenged the 8
th
constitutional amendment, and on
16
th
October 1994, the Respondent tabled a bill, the 11
th
Constitutional
Amendment, seeking to nullify the right of independent candidates to contest
Presidential, Parliamentary and Local Government elections.
3. According to the Applicants, on 24 October 1994, the High Court found in favour
of Reverend Mtikila, and declared that it was lawful for independent candidates to
contest elections. On 2 December 1994, the National Assembly passed the
Eleventh Constitutional Amendment, whose effect was to the position of the 8
th
amendment, thus reversing the High Court decision of 24 October 1994.
4. In 2005, Reverend Mtikila again challenged the Eleventh Amendment,  and in
May 2006, the High Court again ruled in his favour, stating that the impugned
amendments were violative of the democratic values and principles enshrined in
the Constitution. 5. In 2009, the Respondent appealed the decision of the High Court to the Court of
Appeal, (the highest Court in the country), and in June 2010, the Court of Appeal,
reversed the decision of the High Court.
6. The Applicants note that the effect of the violation is that a great majority of
Tanzanians who do not belong to political parties have been discriminated
against and denied the opportunity to take part in public affairs or from being
elected.

Applications No 009&011 – Tanganyika Law Society and The Legal and Human Rights Centre and Reverend Christopher Mtikila V. The United Republic of Tanzania



CASE NOTE
REVEREND CHRISTOPHER R. MTIKILA V THE UNITED REPUBLUC OF TANZANIA
APPLICATION  NO. 011/2011
A. THE PARTIES
1. The Applicant, Reverend Christopher R. Mtikila, is a citizen of the United
Republic of Tanzania. He is represented by Counsels, Setondji Adjovi, Mary R.
Birdi, Deogratias M. Njau and Megan R. Thompson, all of  Etudes Vihode of
Benin,  Charles Adeogun-Phillips of Charles Anthony LLP (Nigeria) and Francis
Dako of Cabinet Francis Dako, Benin.
2. The Respondent is the United Republic of Tanzania and is a State Party to the
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (African Charter) having ratified it
on 18 February 1984 and in respect of which it entered into force on 21 October
1986. The Respondent is a State Party to the Protocol to the African Charter on
Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Establishment of an African Court on Human
and Peoples’ Rights (Protocol Establishing the Court)  which it ratified on 6
February 2006. The applicant alleges that the Respondent  has  deposited the
Declaration required under Article 34(6) of the Protocol Establishing the Court
allowing individuals and NGOs with Observer Status before the Commission to
directly access the Court. Further, the Respondent is also a State Party to the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) since 11 June 1976.
3. The Respondent is represented by:
1. Mr. George M. Masaju, Deputy Attorney General
Attorney General’s Chambers
Dar es Salaam
2. Mr. Mathew Mwaimu, Director of Constitutional Affairs and Human Rights
Attorney General’s Chambers
Dar es Salaam
3. Mrs. Irene Kasyanju-Assistant Director and Head of Legal Affairs Unit
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation
Dar es SalaamPage 2 of 6
4. Ms. Sarah Mwaipopo, Senior State Attorney
Attorney General’s Chambers
Dar es Salaam
5. Mrs. Alesia Mbuya, Senior State Attorney
Attorney General’s Chambers
Dar es Salaam
6. Mr. Benedict Msuya Second Secretary/Legal Officer
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation
Dar es Salaam

Tanganyika Farmers Association Limited v Njake Oil Company Limited (Civil Appeal No. 40 of 2005) [2006] TZCA 6 (27 July 2006)


IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF TANZANIA AT DAR ES SALAAM
(CORAM: MROSO. J.A., MSOFFE, J.A., And KAJI. J.A.^
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 40 OF 2005
THE TANGANYIKA FARMERS ASSOCIATION LIMITED      APPELLANT
         VERSUS
NJAKE OIL COMPANY LIMITED        RESPONDENT
(Appeal from the Judgment of the High Court
of Tanzania - Commercial Division
at Dar es Salaam)
(Kimaro, J.)
dated the 14th December, 2004
in Commercial Case No. 18 of 2004
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT
14 July & 3 August 2006
KAJI, 3.A.:
In this appeal, the appellant, Tanganyika Farmers Association Limited, is challenging the decision of the High Court at Dar-es-Salaam Commercial Division (Kimaro, J.) dated 14.12.2004 in Commercial Case No. 18 of 2004 in which the appellant was ordered to pay the respondent Njake Oil Company Limited Shs. 63,525,763/= being loss of profit, remaining use value of four fuel tanks, three pumps and an electricity generating machine emanating from an agreement which was terminated prematurely.
*;..
2
The appellant is advocated for by Mr. Lukwaro, learned counsel, and the respondent is represented by Mr. Mkoba, learned counsel. Both counsel also appeared for the respective parties in the trial court.
\
At the trial the respondent company which was the plaintiff, had adduced evidence to the effect that, by a written contract dated 1.8.2002 (Exh. PI), the appellant and the respondent entered into an agreement in which the latter would supply fuel and related products at the former's petrol station situate at Karatu for a period of five (5) years. Before the supply of the said fuel and related products, the contract required the respondent, at its costs and expenses, to provide to the appellant and install necessary equipments and machinery required to run and operate the station. The respondent claimed to have made some renovations and improvements and to have installed four fuel tanks, three pumps and an electric generator to the station.
In August, 2003, the contract was terminated prematurely. Each party blamed the other for the breach. Consequently the respondent sued the appellant for Shs. 88,348,874.37 being loss of profit, remaining use value of four fuel tanks, three pumps, an electric
3
generator, unpaid fuel and general damages. The trial court held the appellant responsible for the breach of the contract. The respondent was awarded Shs. 63,525,763/=. \
The appellant was dissatisfied; hence this appeal.
In a rather verbose memorandum of appeal Mr. Lukwaro, learned counsel, preferred twelve (12) grounds of appeal. However at the hearing he abandoned the last ground after realizing that it ought not to have been listed as a ground of appeal.
In arguing grounds Nos. 1, 2, 3 and 4 together Mr. Lukwaro contended that, Annexture 1 which was supposed to specify the necessary equipments which the respondent was required to provide at its own costs and expenses was not annexed to the contract. It therefore remained unclear which equipments the respondent was required to provide and whether the respondent complied with this condition of the contract satisfactorily as provided under clause 4 of the contract Exh. PI, asserted the learned counsel. In that respect it is the learned counsel's submission that the learned trial judge erred
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